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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by Lawrence A. Slovensky"
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided
several cases during 1996 which represented significant additions or
modifications to the law governing appellate practice and procedure in
this circuit. For example, the court attempted to clarify the circumstances in which interlocutory collateral orders involving the qualified
immunity defense can be appealed, announced a new definition for

"excusable neglect" in determining whether an untimely notice of appeal
can be allowed, and analyzed the use of the harmless error rule in
instructional omission cases. This Article will survey developments in
appellate practice and procedure in the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit during 1996.
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION-APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS

One of the first decisions an appellate court makes in every appeal,
explicitly or implicitly, is to determine whether the lower court order
presented for review is "appealable." The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit recently noted that, "[als a court of limited jurisdiction,
we are obliged to examine the basis for our jurisdiction, doing so on our
own motion if necessary. Thus, before we may address the merits of this
appeal, we must determine whether the district court's order is
appealable."' The discussion below will highlight some of the cases
decided by the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit during 1996
which address the appealability requirement.

* Associate in the firm of Long Aldridge Norman LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of South Carolina (BA., magna curm laude, 1988); University of Chicago (J.D., with honors,
1992). Member, American Bar Association, State Bar of Georgia, and Atlanta Bar
Association.
1. Winfrey v. School Bd., 59 F.3d 155, 157 (11th Cir. 1995).
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A.

Appeals from 'FinalDecisions" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over
appeals from "all final decisions of the district courts of the United
States."' As the United States Supreme Court has explained, "[tihe
requirement of finality precludes consideration of decisions that are
subject to revision, and even of 'fully consummated decisions [that] are
but steps toward final judgment in which they will merge.'.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided several cases
during 1996 involving close questions of whether district court orders
from which an appeal had been taken were "final decisions" for purposes
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In Grayson v. K Mart Corp.,' for example, the
court held that a district court order that dismissed plaintiffs' claims but
which gave plaintiffs the right to refile their claims was not a final
decision under Section 1291.8 Plaintiffs filed an age discrimination
lawsuit but, after commencement of the lawsuit, became eligible to join
in another pending class action lawsuit involving the same allegations
against the same defendants. The district court dismissed without
prejudice the pending lawsuit and provided that plaintiffs would be
allowed to refile their lawsuits if plaintiffs were not allowed to join in
the other pending lawsuit." In the consolidated appeal that ensued, the
court of appeals held that the district court's order, while appearing in
form to be an appealable final order of dismissal, was in reality a
transfer order and was not appealable.' Similarly, in Stillman v.
Travelers InsuranceCo.,"° the court of appeals held that a district court
order which purported to enter a "final summary judgment," but which
did not adjudicate some of the nonmovant defendant's defenses in an
insurance coverage dispute, was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and was not appealable.'
In Jackson v. Chater," the court of appeals held that the district
court's order remanding a Social Security disability case to the Commis-

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
3. Id.
4. Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 838 (1996) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus.
Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)).
5. 79 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 435 (1996).
6. 79 F.3d at 1094-95.
7. Id. at 1092.
8. Id. at 1094.
9. Id. at 1094-95.
10. 88 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 1996).
11. Id. at 912-14.
12. 99 F.3d 1086 (11th Cir. 1996).
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sioner of Social Security under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) was a final order and
could be appealed to the court of appeals."3 The court based its
conclusion that the order was final, in part, on the fact that the district
court's order of remand did not contemplate that the case would be
returned to the district court. 4
In In re Six,'" the court indicated that the finality requirement is
more expansively interpreted in the bankruptcy setting. The district
court in In re Six entered an order on appeal from the bankruptcy court
denying a motion for summary judgment in an adversary proceeding
involving a sizeable claim in the bankruptcy, along with an order in the
main bankruptcy case disallowing that same claim. 6 In the appeal to
the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, the court held that while
the denial of the motion for partial summary judgment in the adversary
proceeding was interlocutory and thus ordinarily nonappealable, the
district court's order met the "more flexible standard of finality" in the
bankruptcy setting because of the size of the claim at issue and the
similarity between the interlocutory order in the adversary proceeding
and the final order in the main bankruptcy case.'
The court also addressed its provisional jurisdiction under the
Eleventh Circuit's "anomalous rule," which allows appeals from the
denial of a motion to intervene despite the fact that such orders do not
formally'constitute final orders. In Grilli v. MetropolitanLife Insurance
Co.,' s the court explained that under the anomalous rule, if the court
of appeals concludes that the district court properly denied the motion
to intervene, the court of appeals' jurisdiction "evaporates because the
ruling is not a final order." 9 If the motion to intervene should have
been granted, however, the court of appeals retains jurisdiction to
reverse the district court's order.20 In Grilli, the court of appeals held
that the district court had not abused its discretion in refusing to allow
two individuals to intervene as additional named
2 plaintiffs in a classaction lawsuit against a life insurance company. '

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 1097-98.
Id. at 1098.
80 F.3d 452 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 455.
Id.
78 F.3d 1533 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 608 (1996).
78 F.3d at 1538.
Id.
Id.
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B. Appeals from InterlocutoryDecisions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292
The courts of appeals have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 129222 to hear appeals from certain classes of nonfinal or interlocutory orders. For example, as the court noted in Isbrandtsen Marine
Services, Inc. v. M1 V Inagua Tania,2 the court of appeals has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) to hear an interlocutory appeal of a
district court order in an admiralty case denying a motion to intervene
in an in rem proceeding because the denial "determine[s] the rights and
liabilities of the parties.'
In Raven v. Oppenheimer & Co.," the
court heard an appeal of a district court's order reinstating a previously
dismissed securities fraud lawsuit based on a change in the underlying
law where the district court had certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), that the interlocutory order presented issues which justified
interlocutory appellate review.e In Maynard v. Williams,27 the court
heard an appeal of an interlocutory decision enjoining a Florida state
agency under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which allows interlocutory appeals
from orders "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions."m

22. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994).
23. 93 F.3d 728 (11th Cir. 1996).
24. Id. at 733. By contrast, in Central State Transit & Leasing Corp. v. Jones Boat
Yard, Inc., 77 F.3d 376, 378 (11th Cir. 1996), the court dismissed an appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), holding that denial of a motion for partial summary judgment in the
admiralty case did not determine the rights and liabilities of the parties.
25. 74 F.3d 239 (11th Cir. 1996).
26. Id. at 241. See also Hudson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 90 F.3d 451, 453 (11th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL 73511 (1997) (allowing interlocutory appeal of an order that
denied a motion for class certification in an ERISA class action lawsuit by retired airline
employees). Other 1996 cases in which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
allowed interlocutory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) include: Andrews v. AT&T, 95
F.3d 1014, 1021 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing interlocutory appeal of order certifying class
action alleging RICO violations); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1576 (11th Cir.), cert.
granted,117 S. Ct. 554 (1996) (allowing interlocutory appeal of orders denying motions for
summary judgments filed by government officials sued in individual capacities); Stewart
v. KHD Deutz Corp., 75 F.3d 1522, 1524 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 300 (1996)
(allowing interlocutory appeal from order striking jury demand in breach of contract case
brought under Labor Management Relations Act); and Harris v. Proctor & Gamble
Cellulose Co., 73 F.3d 321, 324 (11th Cir. 1996) (allowing interlocutory appeal from order
denying motion to dismiss intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in employment
case).
27. 72 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
28. Id. at 851; 28 U.S.C. § 1292(aXl) (1994).
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Case Law Exceptions to the Requirement of Finality
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has recognized only
limited case law exceptions" to the rule that it does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order which is not a final decision under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, is not an interlocutory order from which an appeal lies
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292, and is not appealable under some other
independent statute."0 The case law exception which generated the
most litigation in 1996 is the "collateral order doctrine." The collateral
order doctrine arises from the 1949 United States Supreme Court
decision in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., ' in which the
Supreme Court held that an exception to the finality doctrine exists for
the "small class" of district court orders which are not final but can be
appealed because they "finally determine claims of right separable from,
and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicatappellate
32
ed.v
The collateral order doctrine appears to be most widely used in
connection with the interlocutory review of a denial of a motion for
summary judgment by a government official seeking protection from suit
under the qualified immunity doctrine. As the courts have explained,
qualified immunity "protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil liability if their conduct violates no 'clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known."'
In Cottrell v. Caldwell,' the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit analyzed the current state of Eleventh Circuit law regarding
situations in which the court of appeals has authority under the
C.

29. As the court noted in In re F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc., 60 F.3d 724, 725 (11th Cir.
1995), there are only three exceptions to the finality rule recognized in the Eleventh

Circuit's jurisprudence: "the collateral order doctrine, the doctrine of practical finality,
[and] the exception for intermediate resolution of issues fundamental to the merits of the
case." See also Haney v. City of Cumming, 69 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 n.5 (11th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 1826 (1996).

30. For an example of a case involving an independent statute allowing for appellate
review, see United States v. Manella, 86 F.3d 201, 203 (11th Cir. 1996), which discusses
appeals from criminal sentencing orders under 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
31. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
32. Id. at 546.
33. Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1040 (11th Cir.), ert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185
(1996) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
34. 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996).
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collateral order doctrine to review the denial of a motion for summary
judgment based on the qualified immunity defense. 5 The court held
that it has jurisdiction to review the denial of motions for summary
judgment asserting qualified immunity defenses, but only in circumstances in which the denial was not based solely on factual disputes
about the evidence supporting the qualified immunity defense. 6 As the
court noted, the United States Supreme Court's 1995 decision in Johnson
v. Jones 7 established that a district court order denying a motion for
summary judgment based solely on factual disputes regarding whether
the qualified immunity defense applies does not fit within the class of
cases reviewable as collateral orders under prior Supreme Court case
law." The court in Cottrell noted that if the denial of the summary
judgment motion was based even in part on a disputed issue of law, by
contrast, review of the interlocutory order is appropriate under the
collateral order doctrine. 9
In the vast majority of cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit during 1996 involving denials of a motion for summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds, the court concluded that it had
appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine.' In Mastroianni v. Bowers,4' however, the court found that it did not have appellate jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion
for summary judgment asserting the qualified immunity defense based
on the premise that interlocutory review is "confined to determining
whether the law supposedly violated was clearly established." 2
Because the court found that the denial of summary judgment was based
on factual disputes regarding the conduct of defendant, and defendantappellant had not challenged the district court's determination of the
clearly established law allegedly violated, the court dismissed the appeal

35.

Id. at 1484.

36. Id.
37. 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995).
38. Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1484.
39. Id. at 1484-85.
40. See, e.g., Foy v. Holston, 94 F.3d 1528, 1531 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Smith,
89 F.3d 761, 763 (11th Cir. 1996); McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1562-63 (11th Cir.),
amended by, 101 F.3d 1363 (1996); Beauregard v. Olson, 84 F.3d 1402, 1403 (11th Cir.
1996); Tinney v. Shores, 77 F.3d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1996); Anderson v. District Bd. of
Trustees of Cent. Fl. Community College, 77 F.3d 364, 367 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v.
Clifton, 74 F.3d 1087, 1091 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 51 (1996); Suissa v. Fulton

County, 74 F.3d 266, 269 (11th Cir. 1996); Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1033 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 185 (1996); Heggs v. Grant, 73 F.3d 317, 320 (11th Cir. 1996).
41. 74 F.3d 236 (11th Cir. 1996).
42. Id. at 238.
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for lack of jurisdiction under its reading of Johnson v. Jones.0 As the
later opinion in Cottrell explained, however, the Supreme Court's 1996
opinion in Behrens v. Pelletier," also decided after Mastroianni,
clarified that a district court order which finds that material issues of
fact exist may still be subject to an interlocutory appellate review of
related issues of law.4" The court in Cottrell concluded that the earlier
decision in Mastroiannicannot be reconciled with Behrens."
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit also applied the
collateral order doctrine during 1996 to several interlocutory orders not
involving qualified immunity issues. For example, in TEC Cogeneration,
Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co.,"' the court reviewed the district
court's denial of a public utility's motion for summary judgment
asserting the state action immunity doctrine in an antitrust lawsuit as
an immediately appealable collateral order.48 In United States u.
Ellis,' the court held that an order denying access by a newspaper to
judicial proceedings was an appealable collateral order.' In United
States v. Wellington,51 the court held that a district court order
transferring a criminal defendant to adult status was an appealable
collateral order."2

III. TIMING OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit announced a new,
liberalized standard during 1996 for determining whether an untimely
appeal can be heard under the "excusable neglect" provision contained
in Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5).' The timely filing of
a notice of an appeal is a jurisdictional requirement which, if not met,
bars the appeal." Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure allows a district court to extend the time for filing a late
notice of appeal "upon a showing of excusable neglect."55 The Court of

43. Id.
44. 116 S. Ct. 834 (1996).
45.

Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1485.

46. Id.
47. 76 F.3d 1560 (11th Cir.), modified, 86 F.3d 1028 (1996).
48. 76 F.3d at 1563 n.1.
49. 90 F.3d 447 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL 63792 (1997).
50. 90 F.3d at 449.
51. 102 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996).
52. Id. at 503.
53. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
54. See, e.g., Pinion v. Dow Chem., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1525 (11th Cir.), cert.denied,
502 U.S. 968 (1991).
55. FED. R. APP. P. 4(aXS).
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Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit traditionally held that "excusable
neglect should be found only upon a showing of unique circumstances
which establish that it would be unfair to dismiss the appeal."'
For
example, in Borio v. Coastal Marine Construction Co.," a 1989 Eleventh Circuit case, the court dismissed an appeal where the notice of
appeal was not timely filed because appellant's counsel's secretary
misplaced the notice in her files, holding that "'mere palpable mistake'
or administrative failure by counsel or counsel's staff" was not sufficient
to excuse the untimely appeal."
In the 1993 term, the United States Supreme Court announced a new
interpretation of the statutory term excusable neglect in the bankruptcy
context. In PioneerInvestment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
59 the Supreme Court addressed
Partnership,
the provision of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(bXl) regarding excusable neglect relieving a party from its
failure to timely file a proof of claim.' ° The Supreme Court concluded
that, in applying the excusable neglect term of the bankruptcy rule,
"Congress plainly contemplated that the courts would be permitted,
[when) appropriate, to accept late filings caused by inadvertence,
mistake, or carelessness, as well as by intervening circumstances beyond
the party's control." 1
In Advanced Estimating System, Inc. v. Riney, 2 the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit held that the standard announced by the
Supreme Court in Pioneer should apply in analyzing whether an
untimely notice of appeal can be heard under the excusable neglect
language of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5). 63 In Advanced
Estimating Systems, Inc., the defendant in a software infringement case
miscalculated the date upon which its motion for a new trial would be
due and, relying on the assumption that the filing of its post-trial motion
tolled the time in which the notice of appeal must be filed, did not file
its notice of appeal within thirty days after the entry of the judgment."
Because a post-trial motion tolls the time in which a notice of appeal
must be filed only if the post-trial motion is timely filed, defendant's
notice of appeal was not timely and would be barred absent excusable

56. Borio v. Coastal Marine Constr. Co., 881 F.2d 1053, 1055 (11th Cir. 1989).

57. Id
58. Id. at 1055-56.

59. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
60. Id. at 382-84.
61. Id. at 388.
62. 77 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1996).
63. Id. at 1324.
64. Id. at 1323.
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neglect.6 During the first review of the case, the court had held that
the appeal was untimely and remanded the case to the district court for
determination of whether excusable neglect existed.6 The district court
applied the "unique circumstances" standard and concluded that
defendant's conduct did not constitute excusable neglect. 7 On appeal
of that decision, however, the court of appeals held that the district court
erred by failing to apply the Pioneer standard rather than the unique
circumstances standard." The court noted that other circuits had
applied the Pioneerstandard in determining whether an untimely appeal
was the result of excusable neglect and that the rationale of the decision
in Pioneer,although arising out of a bankruptcy court case, should apply
in reviewing civil appeals. 9 The court held, based on Pioneer,that:
[Wihen analyzing a claim of excusable neglect, courts should "tak[el
account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission," including "the danger of prejudice to the [nonmovant], the length
of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason
for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Primary
importance should be accorded to the absence of prejudice to the
nonmoving party and to the interest of efficient judicial administration.
7b the extent that our past decisions interpreting excusable neglect
apply an unduly strict standard in conflict with Pioneer, they are no
longer controlling precedent. 0
The court noted that "nothing about Pioneer changed the excusable
neglect decision into a mechanical one devoid of any room for the
exercise of discretionary judgment," and therefore remanded the case to
the district
court for determination of whether excusable neglect
71
existed.
As the court noted in Advanced Estimating,its earlier 1996 decision
in Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp.72 applied the Pioneer
standard to the interpretation of excusable neglect as used in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) regarding the opening of a judgment based
on excusable neglect of the party or counsel.7" The court's decision in

65. Id. at 1324.
66. Id. at 1323.

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.

Id. at 1325.
Id. at 1324-25.
Id. at 1325 (citations omitted).

Id.

71 F.3d 848 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 850.
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Cheney, while relating to Rule 60 motions rather than notices of appeal,
gives some insight into how the court can be expected to apply the
Pioneer standard as announced in Advanced Estimating. The court in
Cheney concluded that the failure of plaintiff to request a de novo trial
after its age discrimination case had been referred to nonbinding
arbitration under the local rules of the district court constituted
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b), thus allowing for the setting aside
of the district court's entry of a judgment based on the nonbinding
arbitration.74 Among the facts which the court in Cheney cited as
establishing excusable neglect were: the appropriate request for de novo
trial was filed only six days late, the parties continued to litigate the
case after the arbitration decision, and the late filing was "simply an
innocent
oversight by counsel" rather than a deliberate disregard of the
75
rule.

IV. REvEw OF THE APPEAL
A.

Standardsof Review
The rules regarding which standard of review an appellate court will
apply in reviewing a lower court decision are generally well established
in the case law. An appellate court reviews on a de novo basis a lower
court's decision on a pure question of law,7 for example, while an
appellate court applies the more deferential clearly erroneous standard
in reviewing a lower court's finding of fact.77 The discussion below will
describe the standards of review applied by the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit during 1996 and will highlight some of the applications
of these general standards to specific cases.
1. Review of Questions of Law. Appellate courts review lower
court decisions involving questions of law on a de novo or plenary

74. Id. at 849.
75. Id. at 850.
76. See, e.g., Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 482 (1996) ("'[I]f the trial court misapplied the law we will review and correct
the error without deference to that court's determination.'" (quoting Wesch v. Folsom, 6
F.3d 1465, 1469 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1046 (1994))); Teper v. Miller, 82
F.3d 989, 993 (11th Cir. 1996) ("The interpretation and application of a federal statute
raises an issue of law, subject to plenary review.").
77. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1160 (11th Cir.), vacated,
83 F.3d 1346 (1996) ("We review the district court's findings of fact under the clearly
erroneous standard of review.").
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basis.7" Lower court decisions on motions for summary judgment or
motions under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
among the more common orders reviewed on a de novo basis.
In Kasprik v. United States," for example, the court applied a de
novo review in affirming the district court's order that the claims
asserted by a crewman on a public vessel against a ship management
corporation relating to the crewman's injuries were barred by the
In Preserve
exclusivity provisions of the Suits in Admiralty Act.'
EndangeredAreas of Cobb's History,Inc. v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,"' a citizens' group sued Cobb County, the Army Corps of
Engineers, and the Environmental Protection Agency for alleged
violations of federal statutes in connection with the construction of a
highway in Cobb County.,2 The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit applied a de novo standard in affirming the district court's
decision to dismiss claims under the Clean Water Act," to limit the
scope of review to the administrative record developed prior to the
lawsuit, and to grant summary judgment to defendants based on the
district court's review of the administrative record." During 1996, the
court also reviewed on a de novo basis the district court's denial of a
nonparty's motion to intervene of right under Rule 24(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 the district court's order granting summary
judgment on claims relating to an insurance company's claim against a
bank for improper payment on a check," and the district court's review
of legal conclusions reached by the bankruptcy court in granting a
motion for rehearing.87
Even if a decision by the district court generally involves the exercise
of discretion by the lower court, the appellate court will review de novo
the aspects of that discretionary decision which involved the application
of law. Thus, in Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank," the
court reviewed de novo the lower court's decision to deny plaintiff's

78.
993.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
S. Ct.
86.
87.
88.

See, e.g., Hughey v. JMC Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d at 1528; Teper v. Miller, 82 F.3d at
87 F.3d 462 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 464; 46 U.S.C. App. § 745.
87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1245.
33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994).
PreserveEndangeredAreas, 87 F.3d at 1250.
Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin.,Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1512 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117
178 (1996).
General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. AmSouth Bank, 100 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 1996).
In re Southeast Bank Corp., 97 F.3d 476, 478 (11th Cir. 1996).
83 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997).
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motion for leave to amend its complaint, which is normally considered
a discretionary decision reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.' The court undertook a de novo review because the lower court
had made its decision based on the legal determination that the
proposed added claims were futile because they were barred by the
D'Oench doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in D'Oench, Duhme
& Co. v. FDIC.*
2. Review of Discretionary Decisions. The appellate court
reviews decisions involving the exercise of discretion by the district court
under the abuse of discretion standard."1 The court described in one
1996 case the burden facing an appellant seeking to show abuse of
discretion by the district court as follows: "In order to prevail, [appellant] must do more than show that a grant of its motion might have
been warranted. [Appellant] must demonstrate a justification for relief
so compelling that the district court was requiredto grant [appellant's]
motion.'
Significantly, however, the application by the district court
of an inappropriate legal standard in making a discretionary decision is
considered a per se abuse of discretion."
District court decisions to which the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit applied an abuse of discretion standard in 1996 include: the
decision of a district court not to allow a nonparty to intervene in a
lawsuit under Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on the
grounds that common questions of law or fact did not exist;" the denial
by the district court of a motion for new trial after the district court
determined that it had given erroneous jury instructions;"' the decision
of the district court to limit the scope of discovery in an administrative
review lawsuit to the administrative record previously developed;" and

89. 83 F.3d at 1325.
90. Id. at 1323 (citing 315 U.S. 447 (1942)).
91. See, e.g., Macklin v. Singletary, 24 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1122 (1995) ("Reviewing for abuse of discretion is only appropriate, however,
where the district court had some discretion to exercise, where it had a range of choice in
the matter under review.").
92. Rice v. Ford Motor Co., 88 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 1996).
93. Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1996)
("Although we review excusable neglect decisions only for an abuse of discretion,
application of an incorrect legal standard is an abuse of discretion.").
94. Purcell, 85 F.3d at 1513.
95. Goodgame v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 75 F.3d 1516, 1521 (11th Cir. 1996)
(reversing district court's decision for abuse of discretion).
96. Preserve EndangeredAreas, 87 F.3d at 1246.
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the denial of a motion to reopen a judgment under Rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9"
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit indicated in its decisions
during 1996, however, that the amount of deference applied by the
appellate court in reviewing a decision under the abuse of discretion
standard will vary depending on the type of discretionary decision
reviewed and that the abuse of discretion standard cannot be thought of
as one consistent standard applied mechanically to a class of lower court
decisions. In Jove Engineering v. IRS," for example, the Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's refusal to
grant a motion for civil contempt fed against the Internal Revenue
Service for violation of the automatic stay provisions in a bankruptcy
case and noted that such decisions were reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard." The court held, however, that it will apply a less
deferential standard in reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion
for civil contempt in the context of violations of the automatic stay
provisions of the bankruptcy code, based in part on the clear language
of the code and the independent role of the appellate courts in ensuring
a consistent application of the bankruptcy statutory scheme."° The
court explained that the less deferential standard to be applied in the
review of a motion for civil contempt for a violation of the automatic stay
is not a new standard, noting:
There are few, if any, bright lines concerning what constitutes an
"abuse of discretion." This standard lies within the standard of review
continuum whose contours are developed on a case-by-case basis. We
only hold that we are more inclined to reverse the trial court if we
disagree with its decision regarding an automatic stay violation than
we would be in another context.10'
In Joiner v. General Electric Co.,"° the court held that while decisions by the district court on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed
for abuse of discretion, the appellate court will give greater scrutiny to
Specifically, the
a district court's exclusion of expert testimony.'
court noted that: "Because the Federal Rules of Evidence governing
expert testimony display a preference for admissibility, we apply a
particularly stringent standard of review to the trial judge's exclusion of

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Rice, 88 F.3d at 918.
92 F.3d 1539 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1546.
Id.
Id. at 1546 n.5.
78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 529.
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expert testimony."' °4 Based on this more stringent standard of review,
the court found'that the district court had improperly excluded expert
testimony offered by plaintiff regarding the connection between his
development of cancer and his exposure to chemicals while working for
a municipal government."' 5 Senior Circuit Judge Edward S. Smith,
sitting by designation from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
dissented from the decision in Joinerand noted that the Joinermajority
opinion failed to provide a precise explanation of the standard of review
to be applied in this context."' Judge Smith noted that: "In applying
a 'particularly stringent' review, we do not change the threshold of
review, but conduct a searching review of the record (i.e., take a 'hard
look') while maintaining the proper standard of review.""'°
In United States v. Taylor," the court held that district court
criminal sentencing decisions which depart from the United States
Sentencing Guidelines should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard. 1°9 As the court noted, the, Eleventh Circuit previously
reviewed such decisions on a "partially de novo" standard, employing a
plenary review of the legal question of whether a factor is a proper basis
for departure from the sentencing guidelines.11 The United States
Supreme Court's 1996 decision in Koon v. United States,"' however,
announced that a district court's departure decision should be reviewed
on an abuse of discretion standard rather than a partially de novo
standard." 2 As the Supreme Court noted in Koon, placing the label of
abuse of discretion rather than partial de novo on the standard applied
in the review of departure decisions may have little practical effect
because an error of law by the district court made in a departure
decision is by definition an abuse of discretion."' The court in Taylor
noted that the following four factors should be considered in determining
whether the district court abused its discretion:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines'"heartland' and make of it a special, or unusual, case?
2) Has the [Sentencing] Commission forbidden departures based on
those features?

104. Id.
105. Id. at 534.
106. Id. at 535 (Smith, J., dissenting).

107. Id.
108. 88 F.3d 938 (11th Cir. 1996).
109. Id. at 945.

110. Id.

111. 116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996).
112. Id. at 2047.
113. Id.
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3) If not, has the Commission encouraged departures based on those
features?
departures based on those
4) If not,11has
4 the Commission discouraged
features?
The court of appeals thereafter reviewed the evidence cited by the
district court in ordering an upward departure to defendant's sentence
and concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion in
that case.'
3. Review of Other Types of District Court Decisions. In cases
where the appellant failed to object to jury instructions during the trial,
the court of appeals reviews the effect of an erroneous jury instruction
only for "plain error." As the court explained in Bateman v. Mnemonics,
Inc.,"' "[ulnder the plain error standard, an instruction will not be
reversed 'unless the charge, considered as a whole, is so clearly
erroneous as to result in a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice' or
the error 'seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.'"" 7 The court in Bateman concluded that a jury
instruction which incorrectly substituted the term "qualitatively" for
"quantitatively" in reference to the amount of copied material sufficient
to find18substantial similarity in a copyright case did not constitute plain
error.
In reviewing a district court order in an appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") 9 seeking judicial review of an agency
decision, the court of appeals applies the same "exceedingly deferential"
standard that is applied by the district court."2 In Fund for Animals,
Inc. v. Rice,' and Preserve Endangered Areas 2" the court of appeals
applied the "arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with law" standard set forth in the APA and, in both
cases, affirmed the agency decision at issue. 23

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Taylor, 88 F.3d at 945 (citing Koon, 116 S. Ct. at 2045).
Id. at 948.
79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 1548 (quoting United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 675 (11th Cir. 1984)).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (1994).
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Rice, 85 F.3d 535, 541 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id.
87 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 1996).
85 F.3d at 541; 87 F.3d at 1247-49.
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B. Issue Raised for First 71me on Appeal
As the court noted in Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea,2 4 "appellate courts
generally will not consider an issue first raised on appeal."' 1 In
Caban-Wheeler, the defendant-appellant argued for the first time on
appeal that the plaintiff in a Section 1983 and Title VII lawsuit had not
been deprived of procedural due process because, under the authority of
a 1994 Eleventh Circuit decision, the availability of a state court remedy
gave a sufficient means for redress.12 The court noted in CabanWheeler that while the 1994 decision upon which appellant relied
constituted a change of law, there would be no "miscarriage of justice"
in not allowing defendant to raise this argument for the first time on
appeal in light of the substantial additional evidence of discriminatory
circumstances and the absence of any development of facts supporting
appellant's defense during the trial. 127 In Abebe-Jira v. Negewo,' 2
the court similarly refused to entertain the argument, raised for the first
time on appeal, that plaintiff-appellee's Alien Tort Claims Act claims
were barred by Georgia's tort statute of limitations. 1"n
In Rice v. Ford Motor Co.,"o however, the court addressed plaintiffappellant's argument that defendant's Rule 60(b) motion was not timely
filed in the trial court, which was raised for the first time in oral
argument on the appeal, on the grounds that "'[any time doubt arises
as to the existence of federal jurisdiction, we are obliged to address the
issue before proceeding further.'"' 1
C. Mootness
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the mootness
doctrine in several cases during the 1996 term. In Purcell v. BankAtlantic Financial Corp.,32 the court rejected the argument that a nonparty's appeal from a denial of its motion to intervene in a lawsuit was

124. 71 F.3d 837 (11th Cir. 1996).
125. Id. at 841 (citing FDIC v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 3 F.3d 391,395 (11th Cir. 1993)).

126. Id,
127. hd
128. 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 96 (1996).
129. 72 F.3d at 846 n*. See also Novak v. Cobb County Kennestone Hoop. Auth., 74
F.3d 1173, 1177 (11th Cir. 1996) (refusing to consider argument not raised in district
court).
130. 88 F.3d 914 (11th Cir. 1996).
131. Id. at 917 n.5 (quoting Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 68
F.3d 409, 414 (11th Cir. 1995)).

132. 85 F.3d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 430 (1996).
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mooted because of the subsequent settlement of the lawsuit."" In
Purcell, the American Broadcasting Company ("ABC") attempted to
intervene in a class action securities lawsuit to oppose the vacatur of a
jury verdict and the approval of the settlement of the class action
lawsuit by the trial court." ABC's intervention was based, in part,
on its reliance in a separate libel action on the judgment which had been
Plaintiffsentered in the securities case in favor of the plaintiff."
appellees in Purcell argued that the subsequent settlement of its case,
approved by the trial court, extinguished any case or controversy and
mooted ABC's appeal."' The court rejected that argument, however,
noting that if ABC's request to intervene and request to reverse the
agreement were granted, ABC would receive
approval of the settlement
37
the relief it sought. 1
By contrast, the court found in two other 1996 cases that because it
would be impossible for the court to grant effective relief, the appeals at
issue were moot and should be dismissed. In Velasco v. Horgan,"s the
court dismissed an appeal from the denial of a petition for habeas corpus
on the grounds that petitioner had been transferred in custody from the
Southern District of Florida to the Southern District of New York prior
to the decision on the appeal. " The court concluded that because
petitioner was no longer within the jurisdiction of the court which had
originally denied his petition for habeas corpus, the court of appeals
could not grant effective relief to petitioner, thus mooting the appeal."4 In Wyatt v. Rogers,"" the district court entered a preliminary injunction requiring certain Alabama state mental health facilities
to comply with a prescribed set of minimum standards in connection
with a long-running civil rights lawsuit by patients of those facilities.1 42 The court held that the State's appeal from that preliminary
injunction had been mooted by the closing of the facilities affected by the
preliminary injunction prior to the decision on the appeal."

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

85 F.3d at 1511.
Id.
Id. at 1510.
Id.at 1511.
Id. at 1511 n.3.
85 F.3d 520 (11th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 521-22.
Id. at 522.
92 F.3d 1074 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 84 (1996).
92 F.3d at 1080.
Id.
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The courts have recognized an exception to the mootness doctrine in
controversies which are "capable of repetition yet evading review."'"
In United States v. Ellis," the district court conducted an in camera
hearing to determine whether a criminal defendant should be allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis on his appeal." Defendant appealed the
district court's subsequent decision to unseal the records regarding that
hearing at the request of a local newspaper. 47 On appeal, the court
held that the appeal was not moot, despite the fact that the proceedings
had concluded, because the district court's decision to unseal the records
of its in camera hearing was "the kind of controversy that is capable of
repetition yet evading review. " 4
The court also gave a stern warning to future litigants about the effect
of inconsistent factual representations about the mootness of an appeal
in one 1996 case. In SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co.,'
an insurance company doing business under the name "Sun Life of
Canada" obtained a permanent injunction preventing another insurance
company doing business as "Sun Life of America" from using the "Sun
Life" name."w Sun Life of America appealed and filed a motion
seeking a stay of the injunction pending the appeal, based on the
argument that requiring Sun Life of America to change its name to
comply with the injunction would effectively moot appellate relief
because of the commercial impracticality of re-establishing the Sun Life
name after a successful appeal. 5 ' The court denied the motion for a
stay, and Sun Life of America changed its name during the pendency of
its appeal."5 2 The court of appeals order was sharply critical of Sun
Life of America's argument on appeal that its appeal had not been
mooted by its name change in light of its earlier argument that requiring
a name change would effectively moot appellate relief. 5 ' The court
made the following announcement: "All future parties and their counsel
are on notice that if they make factual representations in the district
court or in this Court that denial of a stay will moot the appeal, they
144. United States v. Ellis, 90 F.3d 447, 449 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL
63792 (1997).
145. 90 F.3d 447 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 1997 WL 63792 (1997).
146. 90 F.3d at 449.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 77 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 79 (1996).
150. 77 F.3d at 1330.
151. Id. at 1330-31.
152. Id. at 1331.
153. Id. The court noted, 'The vigor with which SunAmerica argued that the name
change would moot this appeal is matched only by the vigor with which it now argues,
having been forced to change its name, that the appeal is not moot after all." Id.
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may be estopped from arguing after the stay is denied that the appeal
is not moot."1 ' The court then applied traditional mootness analysis
to conclude that because Sun Life of America could gain some effective
redress by regaining the right to use the "Sun Life" name in connection
with a subsidiary, for example, the appeal was not moot.1 "
HarmlessErrorRule in Instructional Omission Cases
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed during 1996
the applicability of the "harmless error" rule, which allows consideration
of whether a district court error resulted in actual prejudice to the party
complaining of the error, to cases in which the district court failed to
instruct the jury on an essential element of the prosecutions case. In
United States v. Rogers," defendant was charged with violations of
the National Firearms Act for possession of a machine gun and
silencer.157 The district court failed to instruct the jury that the
prosecution was required as an element of its case to show that
defendant knew that the silencer was a firearm, and the jury subsequently convicted defendant.' On appeal, defendant argued that the
district court's failure to instruct the jury on an essential element of the
prosecutions case was per se reversible error and that the harmless
error rule could not, as a matter of law, apply to the instructional
omission. 6 9 The court in Rogers agreed that the district court's failure
to instruct the jury on this element of the crime constituted a constitutional error."ec The court noted the lack of guidance from the Supreme
Court on the issue of whether the harmless error rule could still apply
to defendant's conviction and noted that other circuits are split on the
issue.6 1
The court ultimately adopted the analysis set forth by Justice Scalia
in his concurrence in the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Carella v.
D.

154. Id. at 1332.
155. Id. at 1333. As the court noted, "Acase does not become moot simply because an
appellate court is unable completely to restore the parties to the status quo ante. The
ability of the appellate court 'to effectuate a partial remedy' is sufficient to prevent
mootness." Id. (citing Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12-14 (1992)).
156. 94 F.3d 1519 (11th Cir. 1996).
157. I& at 1521-22.
158. Id. at 1522-23.
159. Id. at 1524.
160. Id.
161. Id. As the court observed, the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits find that the harmless error rule can be applied in this circumstance, while the
courts of the Fifth and Sixth Circuits appear to hold that an instructional omission is per
se reversible. Id
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California' for deciding whether the harmless error rule could be
applied."6 Based on Justice Scalia's concurrence, the court held in
Taylor that harmless error analysis is available "only in those 'rare
situations when the reviewing court can be confident that such an error
did not play any role in the jury's verdict.'"'" The court in Taylor
concluded that:
[A]n instructional omission ... may be viewed as harmless only in
three rather infrequent scenarios: 1) Where the infirm instruction
pertained to a charge for which the defendant was acquitted (and not
affecting other charges); 2) Where the omission related to an element
of the crime that the defendant in any case admitted; and 3) Where the
jury has necessarily found certain other predicate facts that are so
closely related to the omitted element that no rational jury could find
those facts without also finding the element.1
Applying this standard, the court affirmed the conviction regarding
defendant's possession of a silencer under the second scenario, based on
defendant's admissions during the trial regarding his extensive
knowledge of firearms and silencers."

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

491 U.S. 263 (1989) (per curiam).
94 F.3d at 1526.
Id. (quoting Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263,270 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id.
Id. at 1527.

